This Page is Inserted by IFW Indexing and Scanning Operations and is not part of the Official Record

BEST AVAILABLE IMAGES

Defective images within this document are accurate representations of the original documents submitted by the applicant.

Defects in the images include but are not limited to the items checked:
☐ BLACK BORDERS
☐ IMAGE CUT OFF AT TOP, BOTTOM OR SIDES
☐ FADED TEXT OR DRAWING
☐ BLURRED OR ILLEGIBLE TEXT OR DRAWING
☐ SKEWED/SLANTED IMAGES
☐ COLOR OR BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOGRAPHS
☐ GRAY SCALE DOCUMENTS
☐ LINES OR MARKS ON ORIGINAL DOCUMENT
☐ REFERENCE(S) OR EXHIBIT(S) SUBMITTED ARE POOR QUALITY
□ OTHER:

IMAGES ARE BEST AVAILABLE COPY.

As rescanning these documents will not correct the image problems checked, please do not report these problems to the IFW Image Problem Mailbox.



UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.usplo.gov

APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.	
09/868,667	09/04/2001	Eric Jeffrey Lannert	05222.00179 2990		
29638	29638 7590 08/16/2004			EXAMINER	
BANNER & WITCOFF AND ATTORNEYS FOR ACCENTURE 10 S. WACKER DRIVE, 30TH FLOOR			STARKS, WILBERT L		
CHICAGO, IL 60606		ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER		
			2121		

DATE MAILED: 08/16/2004

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.



	Application No.	Applicant(s)	0
055	09/868,667	LANNERT ET AL.	
Office Action Summary	Examiner	Art Unit	
•	Wilbert L. Starks, Jr.	2121	
The MAILING DATE of this communication app Period for Reply	ears on the cover sheet with the c	orrespondence address	
A SHORTENED STATUTORY PERIOD FOR REPLY THE MAILING DATE OF THIS COMMUNICATION. - Extensions of time may be available under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.13 after SIX (6) MONTHS from the mailing date of this communication. - If the period for reply specified above is less than thirty (30) days, a reply - If NO period for reply is specified above, the maximum statutory period w - Failure to reply within the set or extended period for reply will, by statute, Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).	of(a). In no event, however, may a reply be time within the statutory minimum of thirty (30) days ill apply and will expire SIX (6) MONTHS from cause the application to become ABANDONE	ely filed s will be considered timely. the mailing date of this communic O (35 U.S.C. § 133).	cation.
Status			
1) Responsive to communication(s) filed on 16 Ag	<u>oril 2004</u> .		
2a)⊠ This action is FINAL. 2b)☐ This	action is non-final.		
3) Since this application is in condition for allowan			ts is
closed in accordance with the practice under E	x parte Quayle, 1935 C.D. 11, 45	3 O.G. 213.	
Disposition of Claims			
4) ⊠ Claim(s) 1-18 is/are pending in the application. 4a) Of the above claim(s) is/are withdraw 5) □ Claim(s) is/are allowed. 6) ⊠ Claim(s) 1-18 is/are rejected. 7) □ Claim(s) is/are objected to. 8) □ Claim(s) are subject to restriction and/or			
Application Papers			
9) The specification is objected to by the Examiner 10) The drawing(s) filed on is/are: a) access Applicant may not request that any objection to the conference of Replacement drawing sheet(s) including the correction of the oath or declaration is objected to by the Example 11).	epted or b) \square objected to by the Edrawing(s) be held in abeyance. See on is required if the drawing(s) is obj	: 37 CFR 1.85(a). ected to. See 37 CFR 1.12	
Priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119			
12) Acknowledgment is made of a claim for foreign a) All b) Some * c) None of: 1. Certified copies of the priority documents 2. Certified copies of the priority documents 3. Copies of the certified copies of the priori application from the International Bureau * See the attached detailed Office action for a list of	have been received. have been received in Application ity documents have been receive (PCT Rule 17.2(a)).	on No d in this National Stage	
Attachment(s)			
1) Notice of References Cited (PTO-892)	4) Interview Summary		
2) Notice of Draftsperson's Patent Drawing Review (PTO-948) 3) Information Disclosure Statement(s) (PTO-1449 or PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s)/Mail Date	Paper No(s)/Mail Da 5) Notice of Informal Pa 6) Other:	te atent Application (PTO-152)	
.S. Patent and Trademark Office			

Art Unit: 2121

DETAILED ACTION

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101

1. 35 U.S.C. §101 reads as follows:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.

the invention as disclosed in claims 1-18 is directed to non-statutory subject matter.

- 2. Claims 1-18 are not claimed to be practiced on a computer, therefore, it is clear that the claims are not limited to practice in the technological arts. On that basis alone, they are clearly nonstatutory.
- 3. Regardless of whether any of the claims are in the technological arts, none of them is limited to practical applications in the technological arts. Examiner finds that *In re Warmerdam*, 33 F.3d 1354, 31 USPQ2d 1754 (Fed. Cir. 1994) controls the 35 U.S.C. §101 issues on that point for reasons made clear by the Federal Circuit in *AT&T Corp.*v. Excel Communications, *Inc.*, 50 USPQ2d 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Specifically, the Federal Circuit held that the act of:

...[T]aking several abstract ideas and manipulating them together adds nothing to the basic equation. *AT&T v. Excel* at 1453 quoting *In re Warmerdam*, 33 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1994).

Page 3

Application/Control Number: 09/868,667

Art Unit: 2121

Examiner finds that Applicant's "information indicative of a goal" references are just such abstract ideas.

4. Examiner bases his position upon guidance provided by the Federal Circuit in *In re Warmerdam*, as interpreted by *AT&T v. Excel*. This set of precedents is within the same line of cases as the *Alappat-State Street Bank* decisions and is in complete agreement with those decisions. *Warmerdam* is consistent with *State Street's* holding that:

Today we hold that the transformation of data, representing <u>discrete dollar amounts</u>, by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation because it produces 'a useful, concrete and tangible result" — a final share price momentarily fixed for recording purposes and even accepted and relied upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades. (emphasis added) State Street Bank at 1601.

- 5. True enough, that case later eliminated the "business method exception" in order to show that business methods were not per se nonstatutory, but the court clearly *did* not go so far as to make business methods per se statutory. A plain reading of the excerpt above shows that the Court was very specific in its definition of the new practical application. It would have been much easier for the court to say that "business methods were per se statutory" than it was to define the practical application in the case as "...the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price..."
- 6. The court was being very specific.

Application/Control Number: 09/868,667 Page 4

Art Unit: 2121

Additionally, the court was also careful to specify that the "useful, concrete and tangible result" it found was "a final share price momentarily fixed for recording purposes and even accepted and <u>relied upon</u> by regulatory authorities and in subsequent <u>trades</u>." (i.e. the trading activity is the <u>further practical use</u> of the real world <u>monetary</u> data beyond the transformation in the computer – i.e., "post-processing activity".)

- 8. Applicant cites no such specific results to define a useful, concrete and tangible result. Neither does Applicant specify the associated practical application with the kind of specificity the Federal Circuit used.
- 9. Furthermore, in the case *In re Warmerdam*, the Federal Circuit held that:

...[T]he dispositive issue for assessing compliance with Section 101 in this case is whether the claim is for a process that goes beyond simply manipulating 'abstract ideas' or 'natural phenomena' ... As the Supreme Court has made clear, '[a]n idea of itself is not patentable, ... taking several abstract ideas and manipulating them together adds nothing to the basic equation. In re Warmerdam 31 USPQ2d at 1759 (emphasis added).

Art Unit: 2121

- 10. Since the Federal Circuit held in *Warmerdam* that this is the "dispositive issue" when it judged the usefulness, concreteness, and tangibility of the claim limitations in that case, Examiner in the present case views this holding as the dispositive issue for determining whether a claim is "useful, concrete, and tangible" in similar cases.

 Accordingly, the Examiner finds that Applicant manipulated a set of abstract "information indicative of a goal" to solve purely algorithmic problems in the abstract (i.e., what *kind* of "information" is used in the goal? Algebraic word problems? Boolean logic problems? Fuzzy logic algorithms? Probabilistic word problems? Philosophical ideas? Even vague expressions, about which even reasonable persons could differ as to their meaning? Combinations thereof?) Clearly, a claim for manipulation of "natural language input" is provably even more abstract (and thereby less limited in practical application) than pure "mathematical algorithms" which the Supreme Court has held are per se nonstatutory in fact, it *includes* the expression of nonstatutory mathematical algorithms.
- 11. Since the claims are not limited to <u>exclude</u> such abstractions, the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim limitations <u>includes</u> such abstractions. Therefore, the claims are impermissibly abstract under 35 U.S.C. 101 doctrine.

Art Unit: 2121

- 12. Since Warmerdam is within the Alappat-State Street Bank line of cases, it takes the same view of "useful, concrete, and tangible" the Federal Circuit applied in State Street Bank. Therefore, under State Street Bank, this could not be a "useful, concrete and tangible result". There is only manipulation of abstract ideas.
- 13. The Federal Circuit validated the use of *Warmerdam* in its more recent *AT&T*Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc. decision. The Court reminded us that:

Finally, the decision in In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 31 USPQ2d 1754 (Fed. Cir. 1994) is not to the contrary. *** The court found that the claimed process did nothing more than manipulate basic mathematical constructs and concluded that 'taking several abstract ideas and manipulating them together adds nothing to the basic equation'; hence, the court held that the claims were properly rejected under §101 ... Whether one agrees with the court's conclusion on the facts, the holding of the case is a straightforward application of the basic principle that mere laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not within the categories of inventions or discoveries that may be patented under §101. (emphasis added) AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 50 USPQ2d 1447, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

- 14. Remember that in *In re Warmerdam*, the Court said that this was the dispositive issue to be considered. In the *AT&T* decision cited above, the Court reaffirms that this is the issue for assessing the "useful, concrete, and tangible" nature of a set of claims under 101 doctrine. Accordingly, Examiner views the *Warmerdam* holding as the dispositive issue in this analogous case.
- 15. The fact that the invention is merely the manipulation of abstract ideas is clear. The data referred to by Applicant's phrase "information indicative of a goal" is simply an abstract construct that does not limit the claims to the transformation of real world data (such as monetary data or heart rhythm data) by some disclosed process.

Consequently, the necessary conclusion under AT&T, State Street and Warmerdam, is

Art Unit: 2121

straightforward and clear. The claims take several abstract ideas (i.e., "information indicative of a goal" in the abstract) and manipulate them together adding nothing to the basic equation. Claims 1-18 are, thereby, rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101.

16. Regarding the "system" recitals in claims 10 - 18, the invention is still found to be nonstatutory. Any other finding would be at variance with current case law. Specifically, the Federal Circuit held in AT&Tv. Excel, 50 USPQ2d 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1999) that:

Whether stated implicitly or explicitly, we consider the scope of Section 101 to be the same regardless of the form — machine or process—in which a particular claim is drafted. AT&T v. Excel, 50 USPQ2d 1447, 1452 citing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1581, 31 USPQ2d at 1589 (Rader, J., concurring) (emphasis added.)

17. Examiner considers the scope of Section 101 to be the same regardless of whether Applicant *claims* a "process", "machine", or "product of manufacture". While the "system" recitals in the preambles of claims 10 - 18 make the claims ostensibly drawn to be "apparatus" claims, they are insufficient by themselves to <u>limit</u> the claims to statutory subject matter. Examiner's position is clearly consistent with *Alappat*, and *AT&T* and is implicitly consistent with *Warmerdam* and *State Street*. Accordingly, those claims are also properly rejected.

Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112

The following is a quotation of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112:

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the

Art Unit: 2121

art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.

Claims 1-18 are rejected under 35 USC 112, first paragraph because current case law (and accordingly, the MPEP) require such a rejection if a 101 rejection is given because when Applicant has not in fact disclosed the practical application for the invention, as a matter of law there is no way Applicant could have disclosed *how* to practice the *undisclosed* practical application. This is how the MPEP puts it:

("The how to use prong of section 112 incorporates as a matter of law the requirement of 35 U.S.C. 101 that the specification disclose as a matter of fact a practical utility for the invention.... If the application fails as a matter of fact to satisfy 35 U.S.C. § 101, then the application also fails as a matter of law to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to use the invention under 35 U.S.C. § 112."); In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 942, 153 USPQ 48, 53 (CCPA 1967) ("Necessarily, compliance with § 112 requires a description of how to use presently useful inventions, otherwise an applicant would anomalously be required to teach how to use a useless invention."). See, MPEP 2107.01(IV), quoting In re Kirk (emphasis added).

Therefore, claims 1-18 are rejected on this basis.

Response to Arguments

18. Applicant's arguments filed 16 April 2004 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Specifically, Applicant amends his claims to recite the use of "goal-related information". The goal is also associated with a training objective. Examiner finds this to be insufficient to overcome the 101 rejection. Applicant discloses a goal that is "associated" with a training objective, but does not explain what this association is. Are the two the same thing? Are they simply on the same page? What is the association? Furthermore, Applicant includes the word "learning objectives" as a critical

Art Unit: 2121

element to try to overcome the 101 rejection. Examiner finds this to be insufficient because "learning", in this context, is a type of <u>human thought</u> and patents are not available for human thoughts nor are they available for objectives for human thought. Examiner finds that the 101 rejection and the associated 112 rejections have not overcome the 101 rejections made in the nonfinal rejection. On this basis, the rejections STAND.

Conclusion

19. **THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL.** Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a).

A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.

Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the Examiner should be directed to Wilbert L. Starks, Jr. whose telephone number is (703) 305-0027.

Art Unit: 2121

Alternatively, inquiries may be directed to the following:

S. P. E. Anthony Knight (703) 308-3179

After-final (FAX) (703) 746-7238

Official (FAX) (703) 746-7239

Non-Official/Draft (FAX) (703) 746-7240

WLS

08 August 2004

Sixual Si

Wilbert L. Starks, Jr. Primary Examiner Art Unit - 2121